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The Role of Rules in Monetary Policy
WILL TRY TO ASSUME my comparative ad-
vantage on this panel and put a broader-brush
perspective on monetary aggregates) intermedi-
ate targets, rules versus discretion, and the re-
cent history of monetary policy-making- Many
of my positions have been stated in various
parts of several of the recent Economic Reports
of the President.
Above all, monetary policy ought tobe forward-
looking. It should be rule-like, or rules-based,
but not necessarily mechanical as in a Friedman
or Shaw fixed money growth rule. Let me state
a few propositions that support my position and
which a fair reading of history would conclude
are sensible even though there are persons at
this conference who have argued contrary
propositions over time.
The first is that high inflation, indeed even
high and stable inflation, can carry substantial
cost to the economy. It was not uncommon in
the late 1970s and early 1980s for people to ar-
gue that if we could more or less stabilize infla-
tion so that the variance was much smaller than
it had been, a high mean of 10 or 12 percent
might be far preferable to bearing the potential
cost of disinflation. The cost of disinflation was
viewed as inordinately high, and indeed we did
have a high cost, as Rick Mishkin stated, in the
recessions of 1980 and 1981-82. But that cost,
according to any serious analysis, was far less
than the simple models that many economists
were using predicted, especially in terms of lost
output. The costs were perhaps a third, and
certainly less than half, in terms of lost real out-
put than what had been predicted for the
amount of disinflation engendered.
The cost of inflation stems from a variety of
things but one of the most important is that the
fiscal rules that determine our tax system are
not invariant to the rate of inflation. While we
eventually in the early ‘SOs indexed tax brackets
for inflation, we did not index the definition of
income. We still have historic cost depreciation.
We still have nominal capital gains tax, tax nomi-
nal interest, and allow deductions for nominal
interest. It is complex, but when you are look-
ing at investment decisions, those are important.
This is part of the reason why monetary policy
in the late 1970s, likely the worst episode in the
post-World War II history of monetary policy,
was so bad. Attention was being paid to nomi-
nal interest rates rather than, as difficult as
they are to measure, expected long-run real net-
of-tax interest rates.
The second point I would make, and will
come back to, is that those who argue that in-
deed money does matter initially—and not just
for prices but for real output—seem to have
been correct. A tighter monetary policy than
the Fed envisioned in the early ‘80s led to that
costly (but not as costly as predicted) disinfla-
tion. I think that the simple monetarist proposi-
tions available at that time broke down with the
collapse of Ml velocity in the early 1980s (and
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again with the collapse of M2 velocity in the
early 1990s).
The simplistic notions of monetarists took a
beating, even if the fundamental tenets were,
and I think continue to be, more or less correct.
Keynesian and neo-Keynesian arguments took a
beating as well since writers in the econometric
Keynesian tradition greatly overstated what the
cost of the disinflation would be in terms of lost
output. Those who focused on expectations and
on credibility proved to be—and let me make
sure I am careful about this—partially correct,
in my opinion. I think they vvere no more fully
correct than the monetarists were or than the
simple Keynesians and neo-Keynesians were.
All of these schools of thought contained ele-
ments of truth, but none was a sufficient
descriptor of the economy or prescriber of eco-
nomic pohcy. We have learned through the
work of some people at this conference and
others that some households and businesses in-
deed are liquidity-constrained and do respond to
short-run cash flows. Hence, there is some
scope for affecting the shorter term course of
the economy, if and when that proves to be
desirable, with discretionary policy.
Expectations certainly have been shown to
matter. A large part of the reason that the last
decade has been substantially better than the
previous decade, in terms of macroeconomic
performance and in a manner I will describe in
a moment, stems from the fact the Fed has
gradually built considerable credibility on reduc-
ing inflation and keeping inflation low and sta-
ble. The inflation expectations premium has
been gradually abating.
The next point I would make is that the eco-
nomics profession ought to be quite humble
about both our ability to go from changes in
monetary policy to short-run changes in nomi-
nal GIJP, and from the change in nominal GDP
to the changes in inflation and real output.
Humility is called for in far greater magnitude
than has been evidenced by most econonusts;
that will lead me back in a moment to the
proposition that I will make about nominal
GDP rules.
The weight of the evidence accumulated dur-
ing the recent relatively successful disinflation—
first in the early ‘SOs and later in the last few
years, from double digits down to the 4 to 5
percent range and, later, from that range down
to around 3 percent—suggests that after adjust-
ing for the state of the economy the disinflation
was achieved in the context of much lower un-
employment and much less lost output than had
been expected. Some people claim that the 1970s
was just as good a decade and that despite the
long expansion in the 1980s, the growth then
was no higher. But the 1980s were a period
when lots of inflation was taken out of the sys-
tem and the previous decade was a situation in
which lots of inflation was added to the system.
Indeed, if you step back (and I know it is hard
when you are doing technical research on a
specific subject) and look at post-World War II
history, we were in this horrible situation
where at corresponding stages of each cycle—
the midpoint, trough or peak—inflation at that
point was getting higher and higher. And
perhaps the most remarkable thing is that not
only was inflation stabilized but that relation-
ship was broken, hopefully for a considerable
length of time, for the foreseeable future. There
were many people who, circa 1980, thought we
would have, as I mentioned, not only something
close to a depression to get inflation down to
low levels, but that inflation would then start to
accelerate substantially once we got well into
the next expansion.
Can we do better? My answer is yes. And I
will get to that in a second. As I said earlier,
the worst episode was the late 1970s and I be-
lieve that there were several fundamental mis-
takes. One was accommodation and, without
getting into personalities, I’ll just say that it
seemed to me we had a Fed in the late 1970s
that was really not responsible. Whatever
modest impetus and modest cost-push supply-
shock we had, whatever oil prices did, was a
tiny fraction of the total impact on the accelera-
tion of inflation. Some people attribute up to 3
percentage points in the 13 percent rate to the
oil shock. But the inflation was basically a
monetary phenomenon.
The Volclcer disinflation of the late 1970s and
early 1980s, if I can revert to a professor giving
grades, gets a B+ or A—. It was achieved at
much less cost than anticipated despite the
severe recession, but also I think Rick Mishkin
is right that the Fed really wasn’t looking just at
money as velocity was collapsing. 1 do believe
that monetary policy, cx post, proved to be
much tighter than the Fed had imagined and
they did want a more gradual disinflation
(that is one reason they don’t get an A). Whether
a more gradual disinflation could have been
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achieved at a lower cost is something we will
never know. I give the Fed an A— for its policy
in the late l9SOs to try and proactively head off
an incipient, building inflation. And this gets
back to a point several people have made that
monetary policy has to be forward-looking.
‘I’he Fed rarely gets credit when it prevents
the inflation rate from going from, say, 4.5 per-
cent to 6.5 percent, because people never see it
get up to 6.5 percent and then go back down
again. And so I think an A — because they prob-
ably went a little too far. While they couldn’t
have foreseen the oil shock or anticipate the
size of the defense drawdowns and other things
going on in the economy, they probably should
have done better at understanding that the
regulatory system of financial institutions was
going to take some steam out of the economy.
Whether that was desirable is another story,
but I think that you can’t understand monetary
policy without also looking at the regulatory
structure of the financial system. I would give
the Fed lower marks for easing too slowly and
too timidly but, to be intellectually honest, had
they eased as I thought desirable—a bit more
rapidly and a bit more aggressively
—how much of that would have shown up in
output and how much of that in slower reduc-
tion in inflation is certainly an open question.
I certainly give them much higher marks than
most of the academic economics profession—
Samuelson, Tobin, Solow, Feldstein, Friedman,
McCracken and others. Yet, by the end of ‘91 or
early ‘92, they got to about where they should
be, and I think the Fed is pretty close to where
it ought to be, although it probably will need to
move to a less accomodative policy as 1994
progresses.
What have they been doing? At various times,
the Fed has announced or listed in prime direc-
tives that they have been looking at interest
rates, reserves, Ml and M2, commodity prices,
exchange rates, and so on. I think it is very
clear that on the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC) people are looking at different
things but that, in general, the primary concern
is and has been reducing inflation. They have
been somewhat opportunistic about doing that.
They get concerned when it appears that infla-
tion looks like it may accelerate or over bad
news in contemporaneous data about inflation.
It is an interesting issue how much information
that it is conveying and its potential as a leading
indicator of future inflation. They have tended
to take advantage of opportunities to try to take
another round out of inflation when that seems
desirable. When the economy happens to be
slack, they tend to try to help the economy
somewhat in the short run. While there was
not a lot of discussion in the last year or two
about price stability, there was a lot of discus-
sion of that as the primary goal a few years
ago—they view their job as to try to keep infla-
tion low and steady and try to avoid doing any-
thing that leads to an unnecessarily large swing
in output. I echo the lender-of-last-resort, avoid-
a-financial-panic issue. They have operated under
some big structural changes in the economy, in-
cluding the declining fraction of credit extended
by the banking system, the fact that far less of
broad monetary aggregates is reserved against
any more, changes in the international arena
which leads to far more mobility of capital, and
so on.
What I infer from all of this is that the Fed
has to be a compass, not a weather vane, laying
out a basic path that they are trying to achieve
for their policy. I think they have done that,
although at times less than clearly. In general,
they have laid out a course of what they are
trying to achieve that has generally been fairly
reasonable, with a couple of exceptions in the
last decade or so. It is a rules-based policy, not
one that is a fixed rule, but one that basically
lays out a policy path that is deviated from only
rarely and temporarily, for contingencies that
are generally well-understood by the public to
be rare events. The basic rules-based frame-
work is the proper one for monetary policy,
and I think it is probably the way to under-
stand what the Greenspan Fed has been trying
to do, and perhaps the Volcker Fed up to a
point as well.
A far more difficult question is what do you
do about specific indicators. I personally do not
believe that M2 is a sufficient intermediate indi-
cator. I don’t believe nominal GIJP is either,
since we still have the problem of separating
out real growth and inflation. I believe the list
of indicators must include more than one sim-
ple measure such as M2, or adjusted reserves,
or Ml. That is not necessarily a disingenuous
intellectual exercise to throw the Congress off
their backs, although that may be a valuable
purpose. I think that there is information con-
tained in a variety of indicators and the Fed is
going to have to look at all of them.
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Secondly, I believe that it is desirable for the
Fed to lay out parameters, broadly speaking,
despite Rick Mishkin’s argument that the Bun-
desbank and the Swiss have often been way off
in money growth targets. The Fed will continu-
ally face episodes such as we had in the early
‘SOs and the early ‘90s when relationships be-
tween reserves and rates, between one or
another monetary aggregate and nominal GDP,
and among nominal GDP, real GDP and infla-
tion, will be far less stable than they are at
other times. Nevertheless, Id obelieve it is
desirable for the Fed, in the context of the
rules-based policy, to lay out what it is trying to
achieve and how it is trying to achieve it in a
world of incomplete information, rapid structur-
al change and inaccurate data. That is not a
simple task, but one the Fed has performed, by
any fair evaluation, quite well for the past
decade-and-a-half.
Ri~J~.l3I1E:.I.V(]i~.S
Council of EconomicAdvisors. Economic Report ot the Presi-
dent. U.S. Government Printing Office.
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF St LOWS213
Philip H. Dylnrig
Philip H. Dybvig is Boatmen’s Bancshares professor ofbanking
and finance, Olin School of Business, Washington University,
St Louis. I am grateful for helpful comments from Kerry Back,
Jim Bullard, Ning Gong, Hyeng Keun Koo, Mahesh Maheswa-
ran, and participants in the Conference on Monetary Ag-
gre gates at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. A/I
comments are the author’s and may not represent the position
of the Federal Reserve Bank.
What Is the Fed’s Decision Problem?
7
JI~AT IS THE BEST model of a piece of
iron? If it is to be thrown, the best model might
be a uniform mass of fixed density and shape.
If it is to conduct electricity, thinking of the
piece of iron as a hollow tube like a pipe that
carries water, is illuminating. For purposes of
studying its magnetic properties, it may be best
to consider the piece of iron as a collection of
rigidly located magnetic dipoles that can be
aligned or not. In general, the best model de-
pends on the use to which the model is put.
In an economic setting, the best economic
model is one that helps us understand the
choices made by economic agents. Unfortunately,
the specific nature of the Fed’s decision problem
remains obscure in most discussions of Federal
Reserve policy. In these remarks, I look at the
Federal Reserve through the lens of decision
theory. While I’m not necessarily suggesting
that the Fed must or should specify an explicit
objective function, I do think that decision theory
is nonetheless a very useful framework for
thinking about the economy, monetary ag-
gregates and the Fed’s policy role. This should
be a comfortable notion for economists, virtually
all of whose modelsare based on decision theory.
The Objeeh’ve Fun.etion
Many purely political attacks on the Fed are
posed in terms of the objective function, None-
theless, its specification is a substantive issue.
Focusing on the Fed’s role in monetary policy,
there seems to be some consensus within the
Fed that there is a lexicographic preference to
keep inflation down, and given low inflation, to
stimulate economic growth. Separate criteria are
applied to crisis management such as the injec-
tion of cash to help illiquid specialists during a
crash. None of this is entirely satisfactory:
Lexicographic preference for reducing inflation
is certainly not the ultimate objective of the
Fed, which might ultimately seek a good out-
come for the economy given the complex inter-
action between the Fed) the Congress, the rest
of government, and the rest of the economy.
In order to achieve a good outcome, part of
the Fed’s objective should be political survival
with powers (including independence) intact. It
seems that the lexicographic objective to keep
inflation down is intended to do some good in
the economy subject to political survival and
given inherent limitations on what the govern-
ment can do to help the economy. This narrow
view of the Fed does not seem ideal) but is sur-
ely better than what would come under the po-
litical control that would result from any loss of
the Fed’s independence.
Control VAriables
Although control variables include such things
as reserve requirements and discount window
policy, the most commonly used control variable
is the open market operation. I continue to be
puzzled as to why the Fed confines its open
market operations to trading only once each
day in a very limited set of securities, most
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often repurchase agreements in short-term
Treasuries. At the same time, the Fed seems to
be very interested in the behavior of long rates,
apparently believing that movements in long
rates signal changes in expectations of inflation.
In other words, the Fed is trading short-term in-
struments while judging the success or failure
of its actions, relative to maximizing its objective
function, by watching long-term rates. This
choice of control variable, given the objective
function, seems puzzling. Since the Fed is not
the only economic actor in the economy that
looks to long rates to think about inflation,
perhaps a better way to influence expectations
of inflation is by trading long-term bonds them-
selves. Why doesn’t the Fed trade long-term
bonds? One reason often cited is, in truth, ir-
relevant: Operation Twist in the ‘bUs was a bad
idea imposed on the Fed from outside and it
didn’t work. A more serious suggestion is that
the Fed may not be big enough to affect long
rates or, in other words, that long-term bonds
may not in fact be a feasible control variable.
The reasons why it may be infeasible for the
Fed to trade enough to move long rates, how-
ever, aren’t self-evident and usually are left
unstated. In addition to long-term bonds, there
are numerous other financial instruments such
as futures and options on Treasuries that might
be used as control variables. One reason for
considering these instruments as control varia-
bles arises from the recent finance literature on
how price pressure—the amount prices move in
response to trading volume—varies across mar-
kets. Price pressure is a lot like walking down
the demand curve as a monopolist: When your
early trades have a big effect on price, you get
a much less favorable price on subsequent
trades. Most agents who take a position with
respect to market interest rates want to mini-
mize price pressure. The Fed actually may
prefer the opposite perspective. If the Fed’s mo-
tive for trading is an attempt to change expecta-
tions (say, of future inflation) without taking on
too large a risky position, the Fed may want to
maximize (not minimize) price pressure for a
given level of exposure. Trading long-term in-
struments may be a feasible way to do so.
(lonstraints
What are the constraints faced by the Fed in
maximizing its objective function? Almost every
discussion of Fed policymaking hinges on some
implicit constraint. tf the Fed is, in fact, too
small to move long rates, for example, then there
must be some limitation to the Fed’s ability to
short T-bills and go long Treasury bonds or vice
versa; otherwise, it seems that they surely could
take positions that would move long-term rates.
It should be interesting to specify explicitly such
restrictions. Other constraints may arise from
the Fed’s charter. Does the Federal Reserve Act
constrain the amount of risk the Fed is permitted
to absorb? It might seem not. After all, what is
interest rate risk to an agent who can al%vays
print money to satisfy a claim?
Several central banks have learned the hard
way the limitations on their ability to influence
foreign exchange markets. The possibility of large
losses (or even profits) seems less likely in domes-
tic markets, given the printing of money and
possible deferral of paper losses. Nonetheless,
given the 1993 magnitude of $18 billion returned
to the Treasury by the Fed, it seems that trading
gains or losses of $5 billion could cause severe
political damage. If the Fed misjudges its capacity
to bear risk, it can cause significant damage by




We have discussed the objective function, the
controls, and the constraints. We cannot under-
stand a decision problem without knowing the
decision maker’s information set. In finance, we
routinely gather a great deal of information by
monitoring more or less continuously the mar-
ket prices of securities. Macroeconomists simi-
larly often monitor high-frequency data such as
market interest rates as indicators of expected
inflation and the level of the stock market for
expectations of economic activity. There are,
however, many other variables that should be
considered. Option prices, such as Standard &
Poor’s 100 index options and T-bond futures op-
tions, may be used to infer the types and
amount of risk people perceive in the market.
These data permit us to separate the degree of
investors’ uncertainty about the level of future
inflation from investors’ expectations of the level
of inflation. This is important because it is the
degree of uncertainty about inflation, not the
level itself, that makes planning difficult for
businesses using nominal contracts. Similarly,
the stock index options measure investors’ uncer-
tainty about the overall level of future economic
activity.
Other data, such as information on the money
stock or unemployment, are available at an
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intermediate frequency. These intermediate
frequency data provide some independent infor-
mation beyond what is available in security
prices, although how much is really an empirical
question. And then there are the low-frequency
time series, which are very important, such as
inflation or industrial productivity.
This plethora of variables raises the difficult
question: When we can’t look at 16 things at
once, how do we summarize the information in
a way that is useful for policymaking? This is
the type of question that is implicit in the
choice of a monetary aggregate or any other
policy indicator or target. In principle, we
should not throw anything away. However, if
we put too many variables in our statistical
analysis, the loss of power will reduce the quali-
ty of fit, especially when some ultimate objec-
tives such as production and inflation are
available only at low frequencies. Although it
seems sensible to focus on a subset of the avail-
able data, it is unclear what should be the crite-
rion for combining data or for deciding which
data to throw away and which data to retain.
This brief look at the Fed’s decision problem
suggests several interesting avenues for research.
It would be useful to have a careful and apoliti-
cal analysis of the Fed’s objectives. We should
quantify the Fed’s constraints on trading, base
money creation, and risk-bearing. Empirically,
we should have more work with high-frequency
data (daily and intra-day) and more examination
of the Fed’s actual controls (trades) and their
direct impact on markets. It would be interest-
ing to understand better how to aggregate low-
and high-frequency data. Keeping the Fed’s deci-
sion problem in mind will help to guide our re-
search toward the most important policy issues.
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Monetary Policy Without Monetary Aggregates
HE PAPERS PRESENTED at the conference
represent a useful step in the ongoing search
for improved ways of measuring monetary ag-
gregates. Their basic idea, of weighting compo-
nents of the aggregates by a measure of the
extent to which they serve as media of ex-
change, should be rather appealing to anyone
who views the medium-of-exchange function as
the defining characteristic of money. And I
don’t know of any other potential defining
characteristic (for example, the store-of-value
function) that makes any sense. So, to repeat, I
find quite promising the idea that some indices
and weighted sums might do a better job than
the simple-sum aggregates in measuring the
quality of money.
But while this type of study seems potentially
useful for the purpose of studying money de-
mand behavior, building econometric models
and judging the historical record, Ia mnot en-
thusiastic about the development from the per-
spective of monetary targeting. The reason—as
some of you will have heard me argue before—
is that I believe that there is a good way of con-
ducting monetary policy that does not rely on
any targeted monetary aggregate. Instead, it
uses as its target variable nominal GDP, or GNP,
or domestic demand, or some such measure of
aggregate nominal spending.
There are several ways of arguing that nomi-
nal GDP (or whatever) is a more appropriate
target variable than any monetary aggregate.
The simplest and most blatant is to just assert
that it is obvious that a central bank’s main job
is to keep total nominal spending growing
smoothly at a noninflationary rate. But one can
proceed more circumspectly by arguing instead
that from the perspective of hitting price level
or inflation targets, on average over the next
decade or so, we know with much greater ac-
curacy what growth rate of nominal GDP will
do the job than we do for Ml or M2. And even
if the task of developing an improved index of
money is successful, it will still be true that we
will know with more accuracy what rate of
growth is needed (to deliver a chosen inflation
rate) for nominal GDP.
To the foregoing one might naturally respond,
why not make inflation the target directly
rather than indirectly? But to this there are two
answers. One is that, because the price level
usually responds more slowly to policy actions
than does nominal GDP, a policy feedback rule
is more likely to generate dynamic instability—
so-called instrument instability—if it responds to
target misses for the price level rather than
nominal GDP. And the second argument is that
generating a smoothed path for nominal GDP is
likely to result in smaller fluctuations of real
GDP— that is, reduced cyclical variability. (I am,
of course, aware that we cannot be certain
about the latter, given current knowledge, and
also that it is not desirable to smooth out
responses to all types of shocks. But I will stand
by the statement nevertheless.)
To return to the issue concerning monetary
aggregates, the only advantage that I can see
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for them (as targets), relative to nominal GDP, is
that observations are available more often and
more promptly. But we could certainly devise
other measures of nominal aggregate spending
that would be available more frequently and
promptly. Furthermore, it is not clear that hav-
ing measurements more frequently is terribly
important. Over the last year or so, we have ex-
perienced quarter after quarter of rapid Ml
and base growth at the same time as very slow
M2 growth. These aggregates were suggesting
either excessively loose or excessively tight
monetary policy, depending on which one you
utilized - But nominal GDP growth chugged
along reasonably close to S percent (per annum)
in almost every quarter, which is just about
enough for 3 percent real growth and 2 percent
inflation. So if 2 percent is the Fed’s concept of
“zero inflation,” which seems defensible, then
policy behavior has been just about right from a
medium-term perspective. And the point, rela-
tive to the issue regarding the frequency and
promptness of measurements, is that these vari-
ous growth rates have differed in the manner
described above for many months in succession.
One objection that is sometimes raised against
nominal GDP targets is that they might make it
appear to the public that the Fed is controlling
real GDP—that it is attempting a role that is
greater than is actually feasible. But I would not
presume that these targets would be publicly
announced. The role for targets that I have in
mind is as significant inputs that the FOMC
would use in making its decisions, as proposed
by Taylor (1993). Announcements are much less
important, I believe, than behavior.
Having appropriate targets is, of course, not
the whole story; to conduct monetary policy
successfully it is also necessary to have a policy
feedback process—among friends I would call it
a “rule”—that specifies instrument settings, that
is, settings of a variable that the central bank
can control directly or with great accuracy. In
my own studies,’ which have been designed to
see if a simple rule would succeed in hitting
nominal GNP targets with reasonable accuracy
in a variety of (small) econometric models, I
have usually used the St. Louis adjusted mone-
tary base as the instrument variable. The rea-
son for that choice is that the base’s growth
rate provides a nice measure of the pace at
which open market purchases (or sales) are be-
ing conducted, and if the adjusted base is used
the measure takes account of changes in
reserve requirements as well. So it seems to be
the most natural aggregate among those that
are highly controllable —which the base is since
it appears on the Fed’s own balance sheet and
so could be monitored daily (and thereby kept
close to the specified values).
The other main contender for the role of the
instrument variable is, of course, the federal
funds rate (or some other short-term interest
rate). But interest rates seem quite unattractive
because a high interest rate suggests tight
money from a short-term perspective but easy
money from a long-term perspective. Or, as I
say to my students, if a central bank wants in-
terest rates to be lower, then it needs to raise
interest rates. That strikes me as an extremely
undesirable feature for an instrument variable.
In addition, I have tried in my simulation work
to design interest rate rules and have found
that they perform much more poorly than ones
with the base instrument.2 These results, at the
quarterly frequency, are not definitive but they
are supportive of the belief that the base is the
better instrument from a macroeconomic per-
spective.
Most actual central banks are, of course, ex-
tremely resistant to proposals for accurate base
control, on a short-term basis, and have accord-
ingly been rather unreceptive to such policy
rule suggestions. One important reason for that
resistance, I believe, is the belief that exerting
short-term base control would generate more
financial market instability and would also re-
quire the central bank to give up its role as the
lender of last resort. But I would like now to ar-
gue against that belief.
There is a fairly well-known paper by Good-
friend and King (1983) that emphasizes that
functioning as the lender of last resort does not
necessarily require the provision of discount
window loans; what is necessary is that the cen-
tral bank makes available additional base money
at times of financial crisis. And they argue that
this response would come about automatically if
interest rate smoothing were being practiced.
Some critics have described the Goodfriend-King
scheme as calling for a constant rate of base
money growth during times of financial crisis,
‘These include McCallurn (1988, 1990, 1993a).
2See McCallum (1990, pp. 61-6; and 1993a, Section VII).
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but that is an entirely incorrect description of
what their argument or proposal actually is.
Consequently, in a paper that I have very re-
cently written for a Bank of Japan conference
(McCallum, 1993b), I have tried to follow up on
the Goodfriend-King idea by exploring the possi-
bility of using a nominal GNP targeting rule to
generate implied quarterly settings of the mone-
tary base, and then to combine that with a
higher-frequency rule that calls for weekly ad-
justments of a federal funds rate instrument
that are designed to achieve the specified quart-
erly base values. This weekly rule can be made
to imply a lot of week-to-week smoothing of the
funds rate and thereby automatically to provide
lender-of-last-resort support to the financial sys-
tem. But can it do that while simultaneously hit-
ting the quarterly base settings with reasonable
accuracy? That is clearly an empirical question
whose answer depends upon the size of shocks
that occur and the strength of weekly responses
of the base to funds rate adjustments. But I have
begun to study that question in this new paper,
and the results obtained are quite encouraging.
I would like to conclude by expressing my
appreciation to the St. Louis Fed’s Research
Department for continuing their long-running
program of searching for ways to improve the
conduct of monetary policy.
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